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Summary 
This Article  analyses the jurisdictional powers of the  Court of Justice of the 
European Union (ECJ) in respect of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) measures 
both under pre-Lisbon Title VI TEU and post-Lisbon under Title V of Part 
Three TFEU. In Part One, it assesses the deficiencies of the pre-Lisbon system. 
In particular it analyses the negative consequences for legitimacy arising from 
the restrictions on justiciability in respect of pre-Lisbon JHA measures in light 
of case law of the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights. In Part Two, 
it outlines the genesis and substance of the reforms in the Treaty of Lisbon, 
including a summary of the transitional regime that will to apply to the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ over the pre-Lisbon acquis. In conclusion, the Article 
assesses the effectiveness of the Treaty of Lisbon jurisdictional reforms from 
the perspective of compliance with the rule of law.  
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THE TREATY OF LISBON AND THE REFORMED JURISDICTIONAL 
POWERS  OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
IN THE FIELD OF JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS (JHA) 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
A key criterion for assessing justice in the Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(AFSJ), both under its pre-Lisbon split structure and under the unified Treaty of Lisbon (TL)  
regime, is the effectiveness of the Union’s legal order in providing access to the remedy of 
judicial review of acts of the Union’s institutions to control compliance with international 
human rights standards.1  In undertaking this assessment, this Article focuses on the 
jurisdictional powers of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) over Union acts 
implementing judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation (Justice and 
Home Affairs or JHA) adopted pre-Lisbon under Title VI TEU (pre-Lisbon JHA) and post-
Lisbon under Chapters 1, 4 and 5 of Title V TFEU (Lisbon JHA).  
 
                                                 
1
 See S. Carruthers, ‘Human Rights in EU Law: Justice, Terrorism and Constitutional Reform’ (VDM, 2009), 
pp. 1-6. A distinction should be drawn between jurisdiction, which is the primary concern of this Article, and 
the standard of judicial review to be applied once jurisdiction has been established. This distinction is 
demonstrated by Kadi, below Section 2.4, where the issue was not primarily one of jurisdiction but the standard 
of judicial review.  Reference to the Treaty of Lisbon is to The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty  on 
European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon on 13 December 2007 
[2007] OJ C306/1.  The date of entry into force of the TL is referred to as the TL Effective Date: Pre-Lisbon 
refers to Union law prior to that date and Post-Lisbon to Union law as from that date. If an Article of the Pre-
Lisbon TEU or TEC is substantially unamended by the TL the pre-Lisbon corresponding numbering is stated in 
brackets. 
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The deficiencies of the regime of justiciability in respect of pre-Lisbon JHA acts and, to a 
more limited extent, the restrictions on the jurisdictional powers of the ECJ to review acts 
adopted under pre-Lisbon Title IV EC Treaty on the Union’s policies on Border Checks, 
Asylum and Immigration,2 attracted sustained criticism and demands that the ECJ be granted 
full jurisdiction over all areas of the AFSJ on the same conditions as other areas of Union 
law.3 The normalization of the ECJ’s jurisdiction over the AFSJ, albeit subject to potential 
continuing limitations in the security domain, constitutes one of the principal achievements 
in the TL, building on the reforms in the Constitutional Treaty,4 in an area where security 
requirements had traditionally taken precedence over access to justice and the protection of 
human rights at the national and Union level.  Indeed, the retention in the TL  of the 
substance of the AFSJ reforms agreed in the Constitutional Treaty was a considerable 
                                                 
2
 The pre-Lisbon Title IV TEC jurisdiction of the ECJ is described in Carruthers, above n.1, at pp. 231-235. The 
TL  Protocol on Transitional Provision does not provide for any transitional period in respect of the provisions 
on the ECJ’s jurisdiction under pre-Lisbon Title IV TEC and they therefore cease to apply even in respect of 
Pre-Lisbon Title IV TEC measures. The jurisdiction of the ECJ in respect of the pre-Lisbon and post-Lisbon 
Schengen acquis under the pre-Lisbon and post-Lisbon Schengen Protocols is not discussed. See on the 
Schengen Protocols pre- and post-Lisbon, S. Peers, ‘In a World of their Own? Just and Home Affairs Opt-Outs 
and the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2007-2008) 10 CYELS, pp. 383-412, at pp. 386-389 and pp. 394-397. 
3
 See the submissions to Working Group II on Incorporation of the Charter/Accession to the ECHR  (WGII): listed 
in Working Document 21 of 1 October 2002, at p. 3, n. 7: available on the European Convention website at: 
http//:european-convention.eu.int/.   
4
 Reference to the Constitutional Treaty is to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe signed at Rome 
on 29 October 2004: [2004] OJ C310/1. 
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political achievement for the German Presidency that submitted the 2007 IGC mandate.5 
Following the rejection by the French and Dutch electorate of the Constitutional Treaty in 
2005, the Council was reluctant to accede to a substantial extension of the jurisdiction of the 
ECJ over the JHA through the transfer mechanism provided for in Pre-Lisbon Article 42 
TEU.6   The reforms to the jurisdictional powers of the ECJ over the AFSJ were closely tied 
to the fate of the TL.7  
This Article is divided into two parts. Part One outlines the restricted jurisdictional powers of 
the ECJ over the pre-Lisbon JHA and analyses the negative consequences for the legitimacy 
of the Union’s legal order arising from those restrictions. It also examines the jurisprudence 
of the ECJ and the ECtHR in response to this anomalous and restrictive jurisdictional regime. 
                                                 
5
 The IGC 2007 Mandate is attached as Annex 1 to the European Council Presidency Conclusions of 21/22 June 
2007: Document No. 11218/07. See Grainne de Burca, ‘Reflections on the EU’s Path from the Constitutional 
Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty’ (2008) Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11245866 (copy kindly 
provided by Fordham University School of Law). 
6
 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Implementing the 
Hague Programme: The Way Forward, 28 June 2006, COM(2006) 331 final, at para. 3.2.  The Council also 
failed to adopt the Commission’s Communication of 28 June 2006, Adaptation of the provisions of Title IV of 
the Treaty establishing the European Community relating to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice with a view 
to ensuring more effective judicial protection (COM(2006) 346 final) approved by the European Parliament  by 
a legislative resolution of 25 April 2007 (A6-0082/2007). 
7
 The rejection of the TL  in a referendum held in Ireland on 12 June 2008 delayed the entry into force of the TL  
beyond the original scheduled date of 1 January 2009. Following approval of the TL in a second referendum held on  
2 October 2009, Ireland  ratified  the TL. The terms for the final ratification by the Czech Republic is under 
negotiation. 
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Part Two describes the genesis and scope of the reforms in the TL of the jurisdictional 
powers of the ECJ over the JHA and assesses the TL Protocol on Transitional Provisions.   
PART ONE 
THE SCOPE OF THE ECJ’S JURISDICTION OVER  PRE-LISBON JHA 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
This Part focuses on the scope and deficiencies of the jurisdictional powers of the ECJ in 
respect of pre-Lisbon JHA measures.8 An understanding of the pre-Lisbon JHA jurisdictional 
regime remains relevant even after the entry into force of the TL. Firstly, Article 10(1) of the 
TL Protocol on Transitional Provisions preserves the jurisdictional powers of the ECJ under 
pre-Lisbon Title VI TEU in respect of unamended pre-Lisbon JHA measures until five years 
after the TL Effective Date.9 Secondly, an assessment of the continuing relevance of  ECJ 
jurisprudence decided under the pre-Lisbon JHA regime requires an understanding of that 
regime. 
 
The provisions on the jurisdiction of the ECJ in respect of the pre-Lisbon JHA are complex 
and purposively restrictive. This restrictive approach would have been less open to criticism 
if pre-Lisbon JHA measures had been subject to effective scrutiny by national courts and the 
ECtHR. However, as discussed in Section 1.5, such protection was problematic. In this 
                                                 
8
 V. Hatzopoulos, ‘With or without you ... judging politically in the field of Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice’ (2008) 33 E.L. Rev.,  pp. 44-65; and H. Labayle, ‘Architecte ou spectatrice’? La Cour de Justice de 
l'Union dans l'Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice’  (2006) 42 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen, pp. 1-46.  
9
  See Section 2.3. 
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constrained legal environment, the ECJ strove, in particular in its Pupino and Segi judgments,  
to provide effective access to judicial review of pre-Lisbon JHA acts in line with the 
requirements of international justice.10 
 
The Treaty of Maastricht excluded in Article L any ECJ jurisdiction over the JHA, save that 
Article K.3 provided for an optional jurisdiction in respect of JHA conventions.11 The Treaty 
of Amsterdam, as part of the restructuring of JHA into the AFSJ, introduced in pre-Lisbon 
Article 46 TEU provisions for limited jurisdictional powers for the ECJ over the TEU.  Pre-
Lisbon Article 46 TEU provides that the provisions of the EC Treaty and Euratom Treaty 
governing the powers of the ECJ and their exercise shall apply, inter alia, only to the 
following listed TEU provisions: 
 
 ‘… (b) provisions of Title VI, under the conditions provided for by Article 
35; … (d) Article 6(2) with regard to the action of the institutions, insofar as 
                                                 
10
  ‘Indeed the right to effective justice is universal in the sense that it belongs to everybody and, while some 
restrictions may be imposed on its exercise to restore or maintain national or international security, the right is 
non-derogable.’: J. Almqvist, ‘A Human Rights Critique of European judicial review: counter-terrorism 
sanctions’ (2008) 57 ICLQ, pp. 302-331, at p. 330.  S. Peers, ‘Salvation outside the Church: Judicial Protection 
in the Third Pillar after the Pupino and Segi Judgments’ (2007) 44 CMLR, pp. 883-929. 
11
 See J. Barrett, ‘Co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs in the European Union - An Overview and Critique’, in 
Barrett (ed.), Justice Cooperation in the European Union (Institute of Foreign Affairs, 1997), pp. 3-47, at pp. 26-28.  
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the Court has jurisdiction under the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and under this Treaty; and … (f) Articles 46 to 53.’12   
 
There is, however, no conferral of jurisdiction on the ECJ to interpret pre-Lisbon Article 6(1) 
TEU, pre-Lisbon Title V TEU regulating the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
or the common provisions in pre-Lisbon Title I TEU other than Articles 6(2) and 7. The 
following sections analyse the scope of pre-Lisbon Articles 46(d) and 35 TEU in determining 
the scope of the ECJ’s pre-Lisbon jurisdictional powers. 
 
1.2  THE SCOPE OF PRE-LISBON ARTICLE 46(d) TEU 
The purpose of pre-Lisbon Article 46(d) TEU was to remedy the anomalous situation under 
the Maastricht Treaty that the ECJ was technically prevented by Article L TEU from 
applying Article F(2) (pre-Lisbon 6(2)) TEU as a formal basis for its case law on human 
rights as general principles.13  However, pre-Lisbon Article 46(d) TEU limits the scope of 
application of the powers of the ECJ under the EC Treaty in respect of pre-Lisbon Article 
6(2) TEU in two ways which substantially restricted its effectiveness as a basis for judicial 
review of pre-Lisbon JHA measures.  
                                                 
12
 The most relevant provision referred to in pre-Lisbon Article 46(f) TEU is pre-Lisbon Article 47 TEU that 
confers jurisdiction on the ECJ to adjudicate on the boundaries between the TEU and the EC Treaty which was 
considered in ECOWAS: Case C-170/96, Commission v. Council [1988] ECR I-2763. See C. Hillion and R. Wessell, 
‘Competence Distribution in EU External Relations after ECOWAS: Clarification or Continued Fuzziness?’ (2009) 
46 CMLR, pp. 551-586. Pre-Lisbon Article 47 TEU is replaced by Article 40 TEU. 
13
 See B. de Witte, ‘The Role of the ECJ in Human Rights’, in Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights (OUP, 1999) 
pp. 859-897, at p. 885.  
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Firstly, pre-Lisbon Article 46(d) TEU provides that the jurisdictional provisions of the EC 
Treaty concerning the powers of the ECJ and their exercise apply to pre-Lisbon Article 6(2) 
TEU ‘with regard to action of the institutions’. The reference to ‘action of the institutions’ is 
open to the interpretation that the action of the Member States in implementing or derogating 
from pre-Lisbon JHA measures is not subject to judicial review by the ECJ on grounds of 
violation of Article 6(2) TEU. Such an interpretation would disapply pre-Lisbon Article 6(2) 
TEU to situations where the ECJ has established that the Member States in implementing or 
derogating from Union law remain subject to the obligation to comply with Union human 
rights standards.14  While such a restrictive interpretation of Article 46(d) TEU is not 
supported by the travaux préparatoires to the Treaty of Amsterdam,15 and would conflict 
with the ECJ’s practice of expansively interpreting its jurisdictional powers,16 it is supported 
by the general context of the JHA regime’s emphasis on limiting the powers of the Union to 
interfere with the Member State’s sovereign rights in the field of internal security.17 
 
                                                 
14
  For a summary of the ECJ’s case law see: de Witte, in Alston (ed.), above n. 13, at pp. 870-874.  
15
 Ibid, at p. 885. 
16
 Peers argues, in the context of the interpretation of pre-Amsterdam Conventions, for a ‘general interpretative 
principle of ‘wide jurisdiction’ for the ECJ, with the effect that the ECJ’s jurisdiction can usually only be restricted 
or ousted by express, unambiguous wording’: ‘Human Rights and the Third Pillar’, in Alston (ed.), The EU and 
Human Rights (OUP, 1999), pp. 167-186,, at p. 172. 
17
 Lenaerts makes this point to underpin his view that pre-Lisbon Article 46(d) TEU was intended by the Member 
States to exclude application of pre-Lisbon Article 6(2) TEU to their action in implementing or derogating from 
JHA and Title IV EC Treaty measures: ‘Fundamental Rights in the European Union’ (2000) 25 EL Rev., pp. 575-
600, at pp. 588-589. 
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Secondly, pre-Lisbon Article 46(d) TEU restricts the applicability of the ECJ’s jurisdictional 
powers under the EC Treaty in respect of pre-Lisbon Article 6(2) TEU to jurisdictional 
powers conferred elsewhere in the TEU or the EC Treaty. Pre-Lisbon Article 6(2) TEU does 
not therefore serve as the basis for any extension of the ECJ’s jurisdiction over pre-Lisbon 
JHA measures beyond those jurisdictional powers specified in pre-Lisbon Article 35 TEU. 
This interpretation was confirmed by the CFI in Segi v. Council18 where the applicants 
sought compensation for being listed as a terrorist organization in the Annex to Common 
Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to 
combat terrorism.19 The CFI ruled that the claim for compensation failed on the grounds that 
an action for damages was not provided for in the exhaustive list of jurisdictional powers 
provided for in pre-Lisbon Article 35 TEU and that pre-Lisbon Article 46(d) TEU did not 
create an additional basis of jurisdiction.20 On appeal, the ECJ supported this analysis: 
‘Article 35 TEU confers no jurisdiction on the Court of Justice to entertain any action for 
damages whatsoever.’21 The ECJ specifically pointed out that pre-Lisbon Article 41(1) TEU, 
which lists the articles of the TEC that apply to Title VI TEU, does not include reference to 
the second paragraph of  pre-Lisbon Article 288  or Article 235 EC Treaty which form the 
                                                 
18
 Case T-338/02 [2004] ECR II-1647. 
19
 [2001] OJ L344/93. 
20
 Above n. 18, at paras. 36-37.  
21
 Case C-355/04 P [2007] ECR I-1657, at para. 46. This situation stands in contrast to the availability of a 
claim for damages under the second paragraph of Article 340 (288) TFEU where a person’s assets are frozen 
not by a Common Position but by a Council Decision implementing a Regulation:  Case C-266/05P, Sison v 
Council [2007] ECR II-73, at paras. 232-251 
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basis for the extra-contractual liability of the Community.22 
 
Thirdly, even in respect of pre-Lisbon JHA measures over which the ECJ has jurisdiction 
under pre-Lisbon Article 35 TEU, the narrow formulation of pre-Lisbon Article 6(2) TEU 
resulted in it being treated by the ECJ as an affirmation of its existing case law on human 
rights as general principles rather than providing an enhanced normative status for ECHR 
rights and the common constitutional principles: ‘The principles established by that case-law 
were reaffirmed in the preamble to the Single European Act and subsequently in Article F.2 
of the Treaty on European Union’.23  So even in the restricted circumstances in which pre-
Lisbon Article 6(2) TEU applied to pre-Lisbon JHA measures, the provision added little or 
no substantive value to the ECJ’s general principles case law.24  Moreover, the general 
principles case law is itself subject to significant limitations in ensuring human rights are 
given effective recognition in Union law.25 
 
 
                                                 
22
 Ibid, at para 47. 
23
 Case C-112/00, Schmidberger v Austria [2003] ECR I-5659, at para. 72.  
24
 See in this sense, de Witte, in Alston (ed.), above n. 13, at p. 885. AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, at para. 77 of his 
Opinion of 12 September 2006 in Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v Leden van de Ministerraad, adopted a more 
expansive reading of pre-Lisbon Article 6(2) TEU by emphasising the significance of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights as an authoritative source of human rights under pre-Lisbon Articles 6(2) and 46(d) TEU:  Case C-303/05 
(2007) ECR I-3633. 
25
 See Carruthers, above n. 1, at pp. 128-130. 
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1.3 ECJ JURISDICTION UNDER PRE-LISBON ARTICLE 35 TEU  
Pre-Lisbon Article 35 TEU established three exhaustive26 categories of ECJ jurisdiction over 
JHA measures: Article 35(1) establishes an optional preliminary reference procedure; Article 
35(6) TEU establishes a limited judicial review procedure; and Article 35(7) a procedure for 
resolving Member State and institutional disputes. Each of these procedures is examined 
below. 
1.3.1. The Pre-Lisbon Article 35(1) TEU Preliminary Ruling Procedure 
Pre-Lisbon Article 35(1) TEU provides that the ECJ:  
‘shall have jurisdiction, subject to the conditions laid down in this Article, to 
give preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of framework 
decisions and decisions, on the interpretation of conventions established 
under this Title [Title VI] and on the validity and interpretation of the 
measures implementing them’.27  
The scope of pre-Lisbon Article 35(1) TEU is significantly more restrictive than the 
equivalent pre-Lisbon Article 234 EC Treaty procedure. Common positions adopted under 
                                                 
26
 Segi v Council, above n. 18, at para. 36. The CFI also rejected the applicant’s submission that the CFI had a 
general jurisdiction to declare a violation by the Council of human rights as general principles of Union law: ibid at 
para. 48. In Spain v Eurojust  the Grand Chamber confirmed that pre-Lisbon Article 35 TEU is the sole basis for 
ECJ jurisdiction over Title VI TEU measures: Case C-160/03 [2005] ECR I-2077, at para. 38.  
27
 In Advocaten voor de Wereld, above n. 24, the ECJ held that by necessary implication it had jurisdiction under 
pre-Lisbon Article 35(1) TEU to interpret provisions of primary law, in this case pre-Lisbon Article 34(2)(b) TEU.  
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pre-Lisbon Article 34(2)(b) TEU are not subject to the preliminary ruling procedure and the 
ECJ may only rule on the interpretation and not the validity of conventions adopted under 
pre-Lisbon Article 34(2)(d) TEU.28  Furthermore, since pre-Lisbon Article 34(2)(b) TEU 
provides that framework decisions ‘shall not entail direct effect’, it had seemed it would be 
difficult for an individual applicant to invoke a framework decision in the context of national 
proceedings.29 However, the ECJ has broadened the scope of its jurisdictional powers under 
pre-Lisbon Article 35(1) TEU. 
Firstly, basing itself on pre-Lisbon Article 46(b) TEU, the ECJ has ruled that that a 
preliminary reference under pre-Lisbon Article 35(1) TEU is subject to the same procedural 
framework as a reference under pre-Lisbon Article 234 EC Treaty: ‘It follows that the system 
under Article 234 EC is capable of being applied to the Court’s  jurisdiction to give 
preliminary rulings by virtue of  Article 35 EU, subject to the conditions laid down by that 
provision.’30  
                                                 
28
 This exclusion of jurisdiction to rule on the validity of pre-Lisbon JHA conventions follows from, and provides 
support for, the proposition that the ECJ does not have jurisdiction to rule on the validity of primary Union law. See 
in this sense see Tridimas, ‘The European Court of Justice’, in Lynch, Neuwahl and Rees (eds.), Reforming the 
European Union: From Maastricht to Amsterdam (Longman, 2000), pp. 74-84,  at p. 79.  
29
 See  Craig and de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (4th edn.) (OUP, 2008), at pp. 268-271; and B. de 
Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Supremacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order’, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.), The 
Evolution of EU Law (OUP, 1999), pp. 177-213. 
30
 Case C-105/03, Maria Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285 at para. 19. See also: Case C-467/05, Criminal 
Proceedings against Dell’Orto [2007] ECR I-5557 and Case C-296/08 PPU, Extradition Proceedings against 
Goicoechea [2008] ECR I-6307. 
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Secondly, in Segi v Council the ECJ extended its substance over form approach to the 
categorization of legislative acts under the EC Treaty to JHA common positions. The ECJ 
held that a common position adopted under pre-Lisbon Article 34(2)(a) TEU ‘is not supposed 
to produce of itself legal effects in relation to third parties’.31 It then used this proposition to 
leverage a substantial extension in the scope of acts capable of being referred for a 
preliminary reference under pre-Lisbon Article 35(1) TEU to include ‘all measures adopted 
by the Council and intended to produce legal effects in relation to third parties.’32 If a 
national court was in doubt as to whether a common position did produce legal effects it 
would be entitled to refer the issue to the ECJ and if the latter concluded the common 
position did produce such effects it could rule on the interpretation or validity of the act.33 
Effectively the ECJ introduced a new category of JHA acts into pre-Lisbon Article 35(1) 
TEU to be treated on the same basis as framework decisions and decisions.34 
Thirdly, in Maria Pupino35 the ECJ adopted an expansive interpretation of pre-Lisbon Article 
34(2)(b) TEU by applying the doctrine of indirect effect, developed in the context of 
directives, to framework decisions on the basis that the wording of pre-Lisbon Article 
                                                 
31
 Above n. 21, at para. 52. The ECJ justified this conclusion by reference to the limitation in pre-Lisbon Article 
35(6) TEU of acts subject to judicial review by the ECJ  to framework decisions and decisions.  
32
 Ibid, at para. 53. 
33
 Ibid, at para. 54.  
34
 The ECJ adopted a similar line of reasoning to expand the scope of acts subject to review under pre-Lisbon 
Article 35(6) TEU, see Section 1.3.2.  
35
 Case C-105/03 [2005] ECR I-5285.  
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34(2)(b) TEU mirrored that of Article 249 EC Treaty.36 At issue was whether Articles 2, 3 
and 8 of Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA (FD 2001/220) on the standing of victims in 
criminal proceedings37 had been correctly implemented into the Italian Code of Criminal 
Procedure (ICPP). Maria Pupino was under investigation for alleged mistreatment of her 
pupils and the Public Prosecutor requested that the special provisions of the ICPP for hearing 
vulnerable witnesses at home be applied. The Italian Court  stated this request would have to 
be rejected as the category of offence alleged against Pupino did not fall within those listed in 
the ICPP but sought a preliminary ruling as to whether, on a proper interpretation of Articles 
2, 3 and 8 of FD 2001/220, the ICPP should  nevertheless be construed so as to provide a 
right to a home hearing.  
The French Government submitted that the ECJ should reject the reference since pre-Lisbon 
Article 34 (2)(b) TEU provided framework decisions did not entail direct effect.38  The 
Italian and UK Governments argued that, in the absence of an equivalent in the pre-Lisbon  
TEU to pre-Lisbon Article 10 EC Treaty imposing a duty of sincere cooperation on the 
                                                 
36
 For the doctrine of ‘indirect effect’, see T. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (6th edn.) 
(OUP, 2007), pp. 216-220; A. Hinarejos, ‘On the Legal Effects of Framework Decisions and Decisions: 
Directly Applicable, Directly Effective, Self-Executing, Supreme? (2008) 14 ELJ, pp. 620-634; and M. 
Fletcher, ‘Extending “indirect effect” to the third pillar: the significance of Pupino? (2005) 30 ELRev. pp. 862-
877. 
37
 [2001] OJ L82/1. 
38
 Above n. 35, at para. 24.  
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Member States, no interpretative obligation should be imposed on the national courts in 
respect of Framework Decisions.39 The Grand Chamber rejected these arguments: 
 ‘…the Court concludes that the principle of interpretation in conformity with 
Community law is binding in relation to framework decisions adopted in the 
context of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. When applying national 
law, the national court that is called upon to interpret it must do so in so far as 
possible in the light of the wording and purpose of the framework decision  in 
order to attain the result which it pursues and thus comply with Article 
34(2)(b) EU.’40 
However, the ECJ confirmed that this interpretative principle is subject to its case law 
developed in the context of directives, and in particular to the general principles of legal 
certainty and non-retroactivity, so that it could not be applied so as to aggravate the criminal 
liability of an accused nor result in an interpretation of national law contra legem.41  
Moreover, the ECJ ruled that FD 2001/220 had to be interpreted in conformity with the 
human rights protected by the Union as required by pre-Lisbon Article 6(2) TEU, and in 
particular in accordance with the right to a fair trial set out in Article 6 ECHR.42 
The opportunities for national courts to refer the interpretation of framework decisions to the 
ECJ were enhanced by Pupino since it substantially extends the potential impact of 
                                                 
39
 Ibid, at paras. 25-26.  
40
 Ibid, at para. 43. 
41
 Ibid, at paras. 45-47. 
42
 Ibid,  at paras. 58-59. 
  
 
17
framework decisions on the national legal orders.43  The principle of indirect effect 
developed in Pupino widens the circumstances in which a national court may refer the 
validity of framework decisions under pre-Lisbon Article 35(1) TEU since the validity of a 
framework decision may be challenged in the context of a dispute as to whether it should be 
used as an aid to the interpretation of national legislation.44 
 
Where a reference may be made under pre-Lisbon Article 35(1) TEU in respect of a 
qualifying JHA measure, the grounds for a ruling on the validity of the measure must include 
a review of its conformity with pre-Lisbon Article 6(2) TEU, on the basis of pre-Lisbon 
Article 46(d) TEU, and with the human rights protected as general principles of Union law 
under the ECJ’s case law.45  
Pre-Lisbon Article 35(2) TEU provides that the ECJ’s preliminary ruling jurisdiction under 
Article 35(1) TEU will only apply to Member States who by declaration accept it. Pre-Lisbon 
Article 35(3) TEU requires a Member State accepting the ECJ’s jurisdiction under Article 
                                                 
43
 In Criminal Proceedings against dell’Orto the Milan Tribunal referred a question on the interpretation of Council 
Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings in order to assist in 
interpreting the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure and, by reference to the Pupino judgment, the ECJ declared the 
reference admissible: above n. 30, at para. 44. 
44
 The national court would be precluded from itself ruling that a framework decision is invalid: Case 314/85 
Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost  [1987] ECR 4199. 
45
 In Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v Leden van de Ministerraad, the ECJ referred generally to Article 6 TEU as 
the basis for its review of the validity of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European 
Arrest Warrant,  above n. 24, at para. 45.  See E. Fahey, ‘How to be a Third Pillar guardian of fundamental rights? 
The Irish Supreme Court and the European arrest warrant’ (2008) 33 E.L.Rev., pp. 563-576. 
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35(1) to specify either that references may be made by a court of tribunal ‘against whose 
decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law’ (Article 35(3)(a)) or by any court or 
tribunal of the Member State (Article 35(3)(b)).46  Within the group of Member States that 
have made a Declaration under Article 35(2) TEU, the scope of the power of national courts 
to refer varies significantly.47 The structure of the pre-Lisbon Article 35 TEU preliminary 
reference procedure creates a divergent standard of judicial protection since the preliminary 
reference procedure is the only means for an individual to challenge the validity of a pre-
Lisbon JHA measure as direct review proceedings under pre-Lisbon Article 35(6) TEU are 
restricted to a Member State or the Commission. 
However, on the basis that the doctrine of supremacy also applies to Union law,48 a court in a 
Member State which has not made a declaration under pre-Lisbon Article 35(2) TEU is 
nevertheless bound to apply a ruling of the ECJ on the validity or interpretation of a pre-
Lisbon JHA measure on a reference from a Member State which has so agreed. Thus the 
principle of interpretative effect applied to framework decisions by the ECJ in Pupino49 will 
have to be applied by the courts of Member States which have not made a declaration under 
                                                 
46
 See the list of declarations pursuant to Article 35(2) and (3) TEU at: 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2008-09/art35_2008-09-25_17-37-4_434.pdf.   
47
 Article 10(1) of the TL Transitional Protocol retains for the transitional period the acceptance of jurisdictional 
powers of the ECJ under pre-Lisbon Article 35(2) TEU. 
48
 See K. Lenaerts and T. Corthaut, ‘Of Birds and Hedges: The Role of Primacy in Invoking Norms of EU Law’ 
(2006) 31 ELRev., pp. 287-315 at p. 288.  TL Declaration No. 17 on Primacy provides ‘the Treaties and the law 
adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of the Member States’ under the 
conditions laid down by the ECJ’s ‘well settled’ case law. 
49
 Above n. 30. 
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Article 35(2) TEU.   This conclusion is supported by the right of intervention granted to such 
Member States in Article 35(1) TEU references under Article 35(4) TEU.50  
1.3.2.  Pre-Lisbon Article 35(6) TEU Judicial Review Proceedings 
Pre-Lisbon Article 35(6) TEU provides the ECJ shall have jurisdiction to review the legality 
of framework decisions and decisions in actions bought by a Member State or the 
Commission within two months of the publication of the measure on grounds of lack of 
competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the TEU 
or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers.51 The grounds of review 
under pre-Lisbon Article 35(6) TEU, which replicate the grounds of review set out in the 
second paragraph of pre-Lisbon Article 230 EC Treaty save for the reference to infringement 
of the TEU in lieu of the EC Treaty, would also encompass the human rights protected as 
general principles and, by virtue of pre-Lisbon Article 46(d) TEU, as protected by pre-Lisbon 
Article 6(2) TEU.52  
The restrictions on locus standi in pre-Lisbon Article 35(6) TEU are particularly onerous 
since under pre-Lisbon Article 34(2) TEU framework decisions and decisions must be 
adopted unanimously by the Council acting on the initiative of any Member State or the 
                                                 
50
 This right was referred to by the ECJ in Pupino, above n. 30, at para. 37. 
51
 In Segi the ECJ stated that it had jurisdiction under pre-Lisbon Article 35(6) TEU to review the lawfulness of 
JHA measures intended to produce legal effects even if not formally categorised as framework decisions or 
decisions, above n. 21, at para. 55. 
52
 See Peers, in Alston (ed.), above n. 16, at p. 174.  
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Commission. The only realistic challenge is therefore likely to be by the Commission in the 
event of a proposal by a Member State.53  
An individual applicant is, however, excluded from access to the ECJ under pre-Lisbon 
Article 35(6) TEU.54 An individual applicant’s only potential redress in Union law is to seek 
a reference for a preliminary ruling under pre-Lisbon Article 35(1) TEU on the validity of a 
framework decision or decision or on the validity of measures implementing them. However, 
as discussed at Section 1.3.1, there are substantial obstacles to obtaining such a reference 
even if the relevant Member State has made a pre-Lisbon Article 35(2) TEU Declaration. In 
addition, an applicant would be faced with the same general problems associated with the 
preliminary reference procedure under pre-Lisbon Article  234 EC Treaty.55  Alternatively, 
an individual applicant could seek to seek to challenge the validity of the framework decision 
or decision in the national courts56 or challenge the validity of any implementing national 
                                                 
53
 In Commission v Council,  the Commission successfully bought an action under pre-Lisbon Article 35(6) 
TEU challenging the validity of Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 27 January 2003 on the protection of the 
environment through criminal law on the grounds the measure should properly have been adopted as a directive 
under pre-Lisbon Article 175 EC Treaty: Case C-176/03 [2005] ECR I-7879. 
54
 Since pre-Lisbon Article 35(6) TEU is primary Union law, the ECJ is precluded from ruling on its conformity 
with the right of access to justice guaranteed in international human rights instruments: Case C-253/94, Roujansky v 
Council [1995] ECR I-7, at paras. 9-11.   
55
 For an analysis of the deficiencies of the the pre-Lisbon Article 234 EC Treaty  procedure, see AG Jacob’s 
Opinion in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council (UPA): Case C-50/00 [2002] ECR I-6677, at paras. 40-44.  
56
 Although in the light of Foto-Frost, above n. 44, the national court has limited powers in respect of ruling on the 
validity of Union measures without a reference to the ECJ.   
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measures.57  If no effective remedy is available in either the national or Union legal system, 
an application may lie to the ECtHR for a breach of the right of access to justice guaranteed 
by Articles 6 and 13 ECHR.58   
1.3.3.  The Pre-Lisbon Article 35(7) TEU Dispute Resolution Procedure 
Pre-Lisbon Article 35(7) TEU provides the ECJ shall have jurisdiction to rule on any dispute 
between Member States regarding the interpretation or the application of acts adopted under 
pre-Lisbon Article 34(2) TEU whenever the Council cannot settle a dispute within six 
months of referral to the Council by one of its members. Pre-Lisbon Article 35(7) TEU 
provides the ECJ shall ‘also have jurisdiction to rule on any dispute between Member States 
and the Commission regarding the interpretation or the application of conventions 
established under Article 34(2)(d)’ TEU.  However, pre-Lisbon Article 35(7) TEU does not 
confer jurisdiction on the ECJ to rule on the validity of pre-Lisbon JHA measures. By 
restricting the dispute resolution procedure to the Council and Member States, and in the case 
of Conventions, the Commission, pre-Lisbon Article 35(7) does not address the onerous 
restrictions on the individual applicant’s right of access to justice in respect of pre-Lisbon 
JHA measures. 
 
 
                                                 
57
 This potential avenue of redress was highlighted by the ECJ in Segi: above n. 21, at paras. 56-57. 
58
 See Section 1.5.  
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1.4. THE INTERNAL SECURITY OUSTER OF ECJ JURISDICTION UNDER PRE-
LISBON ARTICLE 35(5) TEU 
The jurisdiction of the ECJ under pre-Lisbon Article 35 TEU is subject to pre-Lisbon Article 
35(5) TEU which provides the ECJ:  
‘shall have no jurisdiction to review the validity or proportionality of 
operations carried out by the police or other law enforcement services of a 
Member State or the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member 
States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding 
of internal security.’   
The scope of this exclusion has to be read in conjunction with the more general provision in 
pre-Lisbon Article 33 TEU demarcating the limits of Union competence in the pre-Lisbon 
JHA.59  
While the ouster of jurisdiction in pre-Lisbon Article 35(5) TEU is drafted in broad terms its 
scope is subject to limitations. Firstly, as a provision of pre-Lisbon Title VI TEU, the ECJ 
has jurisdiction to interpret its scope under pre-Lisbon Article 46(b) TEU if it is relied upon 
in an action falling within pre-Lisbon Article 35 TEU.60 Secondly, as a limitation on the 
                                                 
59
  Pre-Lisbon Article 33 TEU provides Title VI: ‘… shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent 
upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security’.  See 
Section 2.2 for analysis of the corresponding provision in Article 72 TFEU introduced by the TL . 
60
 Advocaten voor de Wereld, above n. 24, at para. 18. 
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jurisdiction of the ECJ, pre-Lisbon Article 35(5) TEU should be interpreted restrictively.61 
The concept of ‘internal security’ should therefore be given a narrower scope than that of 
public security.62 ‘The case-law of the Court of Justice shows that the concept of public 
security does not have a single and specific meaning. Thus the concept covers both the 
internal security of a Member State and its external security’.63  Thirdly, pre-Lisbon Article 
35(5) TEU only excludes ECJ jurisdiction in respect of action undertaken by the Member 
States and not in respect of JHA measures adopted by the Council.64 In this respect, pre-
Lisbon Article 35(5) TEU is less restrictive than pre-Lisbon Article 68(2) EC Treaty that 
excluded ECJ jurisdiction in respect of any act adopted pursuant to pre-Lisbon Article 62(1) 
EC Treaty ‘relating to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal 
security.’65 
                                                 
61
 See: Peers, in Alston (ed.), above n. 16, at p. 172; and Tridimas, in Lynch, Neuwahl and Rees (eds.), above n. 28, 
at p. 77. 
62
 Public security is a basis for derogations under pre-Lisbon Articles 30, 39, 46, 296, and 297 EC Treaty. The ECJ 
has held that these provisions: ‘… deal with exceptional and clearly defined cases. It is not possible to infer from 
those articles that there is inherent in the Treaty a general exception excluding from the scope of Community law all 
measures taken for reasons of public security. To recognise the existence of such an exception, regardless of the 
specific requirements laid down by the Treaty, might impair the binding nature of Community law and its uniform 
application’: Case C-285/98, Kreil v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2000] ECR 1-69, at para. 16.  
63
  Case T-174/95, Svenska Jounalistförbundet [1988] ECR II-2289, at para. 121. 
64
 See Peers, in Alston (ed.), above n. 16, at p. 175.  
65
 Pre-Lisbon Article 68(2) TEC is repealed by the TL. 
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1.5 THE SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE ECtHR OVER PRE-LISBON JHA ACTS 
 
Notwithstanding the liberal interpretation adopted by the ECJ as to the scope of its 
jurisdictional powers under pre-Lisbon Article 35 TEU, there remain, as in Segi v Council,66 
situations where a potential litigant is deprived of an effective remedy to challenge the 
validity of a JHA measure before the ECJ. In this scenario, the ECtHR offers an alternative 
for a litigant who had exhausted national remedies.67 However, Segi and Gestoras Pro-
Amnistía v Germany cast doubts on the availability of a remedy under the ECHR in such 
circumstances.68 The ECtHR declared inadmissible the application, on behalf of the Basque 
youth movement Segi, challenging the Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the 
application of specific measures to combat terrorism adopted under pre-Lisbon Articles 15 
and 34 TEU (the 2001/931 Common Position)69 for violation of Articles 6, 6(2), 10, 11 and 
13 of the ECHR and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR. The ECtHR held that Article 4 
of the 2001/931 Common Position did not affect the applicants directly and that in 
consequence they were not ‘victims of a violation of the Convention within the meaning of 
                                                 
66
 Above n. 18 and  21. 
 
67
 See, S. Douglas-Scott, ‘A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the growing European Human 
Rights Acquis’ (2006) 43 CMLR, pp.  629-665, at pp. 636-639. 
68
 Decision of 23 May 2002 (Tr.), Nos  6422/02 and 9916/02, 2002-V DA, pp. 1-10.  See J. Callewaert, ‘The 
European Court of Human Rights and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (2007) 8 ERA Forum, pp. 
511-518. 
69
 2001/931/CFSP: [2001] OJ L344/93. 
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Article 34 of the Convention’.70  
 
The ECtHR justified its decision in Segi and Gestoras Pro-Amnistía on the basis that Article 
4 of the 2001/931 Common Position did not in itself confer additional powers exercisable 
against the applicants and that national or Community measures implementing Article 4 
would ‘be subject to the form of judicial review established in each legal order concerned, 
whether international or national.’71 The ECtHR also questioned, albeit obiter, whether the 
applicants had exhausted ‘the remedies which the European Union could offer them, such as 
a compensation claim or even an application for annulment’ in the light of the CFI’s 
judgment in Jégo-Quéré v Commission.72 However, key assumptions on which the ECtHR 
based its 2002 decision in Segi and Gestoras Pro-Amnistía are open to criticism. 
 
Firstly, it is arguable the ECtHR underestimated the detrimental consequences for an 
organisation of being listed as a terrorist organisation in the Annex to the 2001/931 Common 
                                                 
70
 Segi and Gestoras, above n. 68, at p. 9.  Article 4 of the 2001/931 Common Position provided an obligation for 
Member States to engage in police and judicial cooperation under pre-Lisbon Title VI TEU to prevent terrorist acts 
and in particular in respect of enquiries and proceedings in respect of persons, groups and entities listed in the annex 
to the 2001/931 Common Position, which included the applicants. 
71
 Segi and Gestoras , ibid., at p. 9. The reference to international judicial review presumably extends to the role of 
the ECtHR in reviewing national measures implementing pre-Lisbon JHA measures.  
72
 Ibid., at p. 6. On 3 May 2002 the CFI had  reformulated the test for ‘individual concern’ under paragraph four of 
Article 230 EC Treaty in  a manner favourable to individual applicants:  Case T-177/01 [2002] ECR II-2365, at 
para. 51. 
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Position.73 Indeed, the decision in Segi and Gestoras Pro-Amnistía itself refers to the 
measures adopted three months previously by the Spanish investigating judge suspending 
Segi’s activities and detaining eleven of its leaders pending trial where the judge referred to 
the 2001/931  Common Position.74 
 
Secondly, Segi and Gestoras Pro-Amnistía in retrospect overestimated the potential for 
judicial review of implementing measures, at least as regards redress at the Union level.75 
The basis for the ECtHR’s assessment of the availability of Union remedies was undermined 
when the ECJ reversed the CFI’s decision in Jégo-Quéré76 and the CFI, and on appeal the 
ECJ, ruled in Segi v. Council that there was no jurisdiction under pre-Lisbon Article 35 TEU 
for a compensation claim in respect of a JHA measure such as Article 4 of the 2001/931 
Common Position.77  
 
Indeed in Segi v Council the CFI expressed doubts as to whether the applicants had access to 
any effective remedy whether before the Community or national jurisdictions for their listing 
                                                 
73
 See Bowring and Korff, ‘Terrorist Designation with Regard to European and International Law: The Case of the 
PMOI’, Joint Opinion presented at the International Conference of Jurists on 10 November 2004: 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/feb/bb-dk-joint-paper.pdf, at pp. 15-16. 
74
 Segi, above n. 68, at p. 2. 
75
 Bowring and Korff argue that a strategy based on exhausting national remedies and then applying to the ECtHR is 
preferable to seeking redress before the CFI or ECJ: above n. 73, at p. 31.  
76
 Case C-263/02 P, Jégo-Quéré v Commission [2004] ECR I-3425.  
77
  Above n. 18 and  21.  
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in the Annex to the 2001/931 Common Position.78 However, the CFI held itself precluded by 
the ECJ decision in UPA from adopting its reasoning in Jégo-Quéré or that of AG Jacobs in 
UPA that such a denial of access to justice was incompatible with the guarantees in Articles 6 
(1) and 13 ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter.79 In those circumstances, the CFI stated that 
the only grounds on which the claim for compensation could succeed would be if it was 
established that Article 4 of the 2001/931 Common Position should have been adopted under 
the EC Treaty rather than pre-Lisbon Article 34 TEU thereby grounding a claim for 
compensation under pre-Lisbon Articles 235 and 288 EC Treaty.  However, since no such 
wrongful use of legal basis was demonstrated, the CFI rejected the application as manifestly 
unfounded.80  
 
On appeal, the ECJ in Segi v Council extended its analysis in UPA to conclude that the 
system of legal remedies under pre-Lisbon Title VI TEU, although less extensive than under 
the EC Treaty, nevertheless did not violate the requirements of effective judicial protection.81 
Indeed, the ECJ went further than the CFI in stating categorically that no action in damages 
would lie before the national courts in respect of the contested Common Position 2001/931 
since it was an act of the Council ‘adopted jointly by the Member States’ and the liability of 
the Member States was not severable.82 However, the ECJ emphasized that national courts 
                                                 
78
  Above n. 18, at para 38.  
79
 Ibid, at para. 38. See on Article 47 of the Charter: Angela Ward, ‘Access to Justice’ in S. Peers and A. Ward 
(eds.), The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (Hart, 2004), pp. 123-140, at p. 137.  
80
 Above n. 18, at paras. 41-47.   
81
 Above n. 21, at para. 57. 
82
 Ibid, at para 36. 
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must provide an effective remedy sounding in damages for challenging the validity of 
national measures implementing Union law.83  
 
In the absence of jurisdiction to review directly pre-Lisbon JHA measures, the ECtHR’s 
jurisdiction to control the conformity with the ECHR of implementing measures adopted by 
the Member States provides an alternative method of redress. However, in the context of the 
a State implementing obligations arising from membership of an international organization, 
the ECtHR has established limits to the exercise of that jurisdiction: 
 
‘In the Court’s view, State action taken in compliance with legal obligations 
is justified as long as the relevant organization is considered to protect 
human rights as regards both the substantive guarantees offered and the 
mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner which can be 
considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides’.84  
 
In Bosphorus, the ECtHR held Community law provided equivalent protection for human 
rights to that of the ECHR system and as a result Ireland benefited from a presumption of 
conformity with the ECHR in implementing in domestic law the relevant EC sanctions 
Regulation.85 However, the ECtHR subjected this presumption to the caveat that it only 
                                                 
83
 Ibid  at para. 56. 
84
 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şіrketi v. Ireland (Grand Chamber) [2006] 42 EHRR 1, at 
para. 155. 
85
 Ibid.,at para. 165. For a summary of preceding ECtHR case law in this area see Craig and de Burca,  above n. 
29, at pp. 420-42; and Carruthers, above n. 1, at pp. 50-62.  A. Hinajeros Parga,  ‘Bosphorus v Ireland and the 
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applied to the extent a Member State was implementing ‘its strict international obligations’.86 
 
Bosphorus was a case decided in respect of national measures implementing an EC 
Regulation which in turn was implementing a United Nations Security Council resolution.87 
It did not address the issue of national measures implementing pre-Lisbon JHA measures 
where, as has been discussed, the scope of the ECJ’s jurisdiction is more limited. In this 
context, Peers has argued, on the authority of Cantoni,88 that at least in respect of pre-Lisbon 
JHA framework decisions and national measures ratifying conventions the ECtHR could 
exercise supervisory jurisdiction over national implementing measures.89 The guiding 
principle it is submitted should be that the ECtHR has jurisdiction to review the compatibility 
with the ECHR of national measures implementing JHA measures in any case where the 
                                                                                                                                                       
protection of fundamental rights in Europe’  (2006) 31 ELRev.,  pp. 251-259;  and C. Costello, ‘The Bosphorus 
Ruling of the European Court of Human Rights: Fundamental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe’ (2006) 
6 Human Rights Law Review, pp. 87-130. 
86
 Ibid, at para. 157.  
87
 In Agim Behrami the ECtHR analysed the scope of Bosphorus in the context of a case on the alleged liability 
of the defendant states for their actions in Kosovo during the NATO deployment: Agim Behrami and Bekit 
Behrami and Ruzhdi Saramati v France, Norway and Germany (Grand Chamber) [2007] 45 EHRR 52, at paras 
145-151. See: Tridimas and Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘EU Law, International Law and Economic Sanctions against 
Terrorism: The Judiciary in Distress’ (2009) 32 Fordham Law Review, pp. 660-730, at pp. 685-689; and M. 
Milanović and T. Papić, ‘As Bad as it Gets: the European Court of Human Rights’s Behrami and Saramati 
Decision and General International Law’ (2009) 58 ICLQ, pp 267-296. 
88
 Case 45/1995/551/637, ECHR Reports (Judgements and Decisions) 1996 V-1614. 
89
 Although he considers that ECtHR jurisdiction over pre-Lisbon JHA decisions in the absence of national 
implementing measures is more problematic, above n. 16, at p. 175.          
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measures are not themselves subject to review by the ECJ.90  
 
1.6  CONCLUSIONS 
Segi and Gestoras Pro-Amnistía and Segi v. Council demonstrate the potential for 
jurisdictional ‘black holes’ in respect of pre-Lisbon JHA measures in terms of effective legal 
redress for individuals for a violation of human rights. The decision of the ECtHR in 
Bosphorus opened the way for the ECtHR to revise its conclusions in Segi and Gestoras Pro-
Amnistía in the light of the decisions of the ECJ in Jégo-Quéré and Segi v. Council and to 
review the conformity with the ECHR of pre-Lisbon JHA measures not subject to scrutiny by 
the ECJ. The absence of ECJ jurisdiction to review the legality of secondary Union law may, 
on an extensive interpretation of Bosphorus, ground jurisdiction for the ECtHR to review the 
measure.91  
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 See in this sense, Lenaerts, above n. 17, at p. 589. 
91
 This point was not directly at issue in Bosphorus since the contested EC Regulation 990/93 was subject to a 
review of its legality by the ECJ on an Article 234 EC Treaty  reference by the Supreme Court in Ireland: Case C-
84/95, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şіrketi v Minister for Transport, Energy and 
Communications [1996] ECR I-3953. 
  
 
31
PART TWO 
 
THE SCOPE OF THE ECJ’S JURISDICTION OVER POST-LISBON JHA 
 
2.1  REFORM PROPOSALS  
 
In the light of the acknowledged deficiencies in the ECJ’s jurisdiction to review pre-Lisbon 
JHA and Title IV EC Treaty acts, there was substantial pressure for reform at the European 
Convention. The mandate of Working Group X (WGX) on ‘Freedom, Security and Justice’ 
did not specifically refer to reform of the judicial architecture.92 However, reform was 
implicit in the reference to striking a better balance ‘between security requirements and 
respect for fundamental values’ and pursuing the 2001 European Council Laeken Declaration 
objective of simplification of the ‘particularly complex institutional and legal systems’ in the 
JHA.93 WGX therefore concluded that a fundamental reform of the ECJ’s jurisdiction was 
necessary:  
 
‘The Working Group takes the view that the limited jurisdiction of the Court 
is no longer acceptable concerning acts adopted in areas (e.g. police co-
operation, judicial co-operation in criminal matters) which directly affect 
                                                 
92
 Mandate of WGX of 12 September 2002, CONV 258/02.  
93
 Ibid, at p. 3 
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fundamental rights of the individuals. The same view applies to the limited 
judicial control foreseen in Article 68 TEC.’94  
 
WGX therefore recommended that the specific mechanisms in pre-Lisbon Article 35 TEU 
and Article 68 EC Treaty should be abolished and that ‘the general system of jurisdiction of 
the ECJ should be extended to the area of freedom, security and justice, including action by 
Union bodies in this field’.95   
 
On the issue of the restrictions on the ECJ’s jurisdiction under pre-Lisbon Article 35 (5) TEU 
and Article 68(2) EC Treaty relating to the ‘maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security’, WGX recommended that pre-Lisbon Article 68(2) should 
be abolished in view of the significance for human rights of measures relating to the free 
movement of persons adopted under pre-Lisbon Article 62(1) EC Treaty. However, opinion 
was divided in WGX on abolishing pre-Lisbon Article 35(5) TEU, with some members 
arguing for its retention and others of the view that the incorporation in the Constitutional 
Treaty of the text of pre-Lisbon Article 33 TEU was sufficient ‘to make clear that national 
acts taken under these responsibilities lie outside the scope of Union law, and consequently 
outside the jurisdiction of the Court.’96 
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 WGX Final Report, CONV 426/02, 2 December 2002, at p. 25.  
95
 Ibid. The reference to Union bodies was to Europol and Eurojust: see pp. 18-20 of WGX Final Report. 
96
 Ibid., at p. 19. 
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2.2 THE TREATY OF LISBON AND THE JURISDICTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE AFSJ 
 
The TL amends the TEU and the EC Treaty, renamed as the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), to incorporate the principal recommendations in WGX’s Final 
Report on judicial control of the AFSJ by abolishing the special jurisdictional rules in pre-
Lisbon Article 35 TEU and Article 68 EC Treaty.97  AFSJ measures adopted under the TFEU 
are therefore generally subject to the same jurisdictional grounds of review as other Union 
policy areas.98 The direct actions in Articles 230, 232, 235 and 288(2) EC Treaty are retained 
on substantially the same terms in Articles 263, 265, 268 and 340(2) TFEU respectively and 
apply to all AFSJ measures.99  
 
The general preliminary reference procedure set out in Article 267 (234) TFEU also applies 
on the same conditions to all AFSJ measures. The fourth paragraph of Article 267 (234) 
TFEU introduces an additional procedural protection in that if a question is raised ‘in a case 
pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State with regard to a person in custody, the 
                                                 
97
 The TL adopts in this area substantially the same provisions as had been contained in Chapter IV of Title III 
of Part III of the Constitutional Treaty. See Carruthers, above n. 1, at pp. 211-213; and Peers, ‘Finally “Fit for 
Purpose”? The Treaty of Lisbon and the End of the Third Pillar Legal Order’ in Eeckhout and Tridimas (eds.), 
27 Yearbook of European Law (OUP, 2009), pp. 47-64. 
98
 The CFSP, however, continues to be subject to the special jurisdictional rules in Article 275 TFEU.   
99
 The principal reform consists in a limited improvement in the locus standi rules for non-privileged applicants in 
paragraph four of Article 263 (230) TFEU.  
  
 
34
Court of Justice of the European Union shall act with the minimum of delay’.100 Furthermore, 
a Member State that fails to fulfill an obligation under the AFSJ is subject to enforcement 
action by the Commission under Article 258 (226) TFEU or by another Member State under 
Article 259 (227) TFEU.101  
 
The various types of pre-Lisbon JHA measures listed in pre-Lisbon Article 34(2) TEU are 
replaced be the standard Union legislative acts.102  However, existing measures adopted 
under the pre-Lisbon JHA will remain in force pursuant to Article 9 of the Protocol on 
Transitional Provisions ‘until they are repealed, annulled or amended in implementation of 
the Treaties.’ Article 9 provides the same regime applies to the pre-Lisbon JHA Conventions. 
 
Article 276 TFEU contains a major concession to the security and sovereignty concerns of 
the Member States in a modified version of pre-Lisbon Article 35(5) TEU: 
 
                                                 
100
  An expedited AFSJ preliminary ruling procedure under Article 23a of the Protocol on the Statute of the ECJ and 
Article 104b of its rules of procedure was introduced following Council Decision 2008/79/EC of 20 December 
2007: [2008] OJ L24/42.   
101
 Pre-Lisbon Article 226 and 227 EC Treaty enforcement procedures did not apply to the JHA. WGX 
recommended that these procedures be so extended: WGX Final Report, above n. 94, at p. 21.  
102
 The legal acts of the Union are set out in Article 288 (249) TFEU. The specific type of instrument to be adopted 
under the AFSJ is determined in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title I of Part Six TFEU. 
Deleted: ¶
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‘In exercising its powers regarding the provisions of Chapters  4 and 5 of 
Title V of Part Three relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union shall have no jurisdiction to review 
the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other 
law enforcement services of a Member State or the exercise of the 
responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the 
maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.’103  
 
Article 72 TFEU re-enacts pre-Lisbon Article 64(1) EC Treaty and Article 33 TEU: ‘This 
Title [Title V] shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member 
States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal 
security.’ Article 68(2) EC Treaty is, however, repealed. 
 
The TL reforms to the jurisdictional powers of the ECJ over AFSJ measures substantially 
address the criticisms of the pre-Lisbon structure. In conjunction with the other major TL 
reforms of human rights protection, the legal recognition of the Charter under Article 6(1) 
TEU  and the mandate for the Union to accede to the ECHR under Article 6(2) TEU,104 the 
                                                 
103
 Chapters 4 and 5 of Title V cover the JHA regime formerly in pre-Lisbon Title VI TEU: namely judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters (Chapter 4) and police cooperation (Chapter 5).   
104
 See the TL Protocol on  the Accession of the Union to the ECHR.   
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TL  provides a significant enhancement in the level of recognition and protection of human 
rights in the AFSJ.105  
 
However, the retention in Article 276 TFEU of a general internal security exclusion of ECJ 
jurisdiction over Member State action in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
and police cooperation has the potential to undermine the benefits of these reforms. The ECJ, 
as in the case of pre-Lisbon Article 35(5) TEU, should it is submitted  interpret Article 276 
TFEU in a manner that ensures due respect for human rights is guaranteed in JHA measures 
whether adopted by the Union institutions or implemented by the Member States. The second 
paragraph of Article 19 TEU introduced by the TL provides support for such an approach.106 
 
2.3 THE JHA JURISDICTION OF THE ECJ UNDER THE TL TRANSITIONAL PROTOCOL 
  
Article 10(1) of the TL Protocol on Transitional Provisions (TL Transitional Protocol) 
preserves the jurisdictional powers of the ECJ under pre-Lisbon Title VI TEU in respect of 
pre-Lisbon JHA acts. Articles 10(2) and (3) of the TL Transitional Protocol respectively 
provide that these transitional provisions cease to apply to any pre-Lisbon JHA act amended 
prior to that date for any Member State to which that amended act applies and in any event 
expire five years after the TL Effective Date. As a result, the scope of the ECJ’s jurisdiction 
                                                 
105
 In addition, Article 6(3) TEU retains the substance of pre-Lisbon Article 6(2) TEU. See S. Carruthers:  
‘Beware of Lawyers Bearing Gifts: A Critical Evaluation of the Proposals on Fundamental Rights in the EU 
Constitutional Treaty’ (2004) 4 EHRLR, pp. 424-435. 
106
 ‘The Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields coverd 
by Union law.’ See Carruthers, above  n.1, at pp. 161-163. 
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will depend on whether a JHA act was adopted before or after the TL Effective Date and, if 
adopted before that date, whether or not it has been amended. It is hard justify this system 
that will prolong the deficiencies of the pre-Lisbon JHA jurisdictional regime. The impact of 
Article 10(1) of the TL Transitional Protocol will be substantial in view of the significant 
body of pre-Lisbon JHA measures.107 
 
The UK has negotiated its own opt-out/opt-in regime under Article 10(4) and (5) of the TL 
Transitional Protocol allowing it, not later than six months before the expiry of five years 
after the TL Effective Date, to elect to disapply all  pre-Lisbon JHA acts and subsequently to 
reverse this decision in respect of any such acts. If the UK decides to exercise this opt-
out/opt-in it will add to the Byzantine complexity of the various opt-outs and opt-ins 
applying to Denmark, the UK, and Ireland in the AFSJ under the relevant TL Protocols.108  
However, these Protocols do not in themselves raise issues of legitimacy as regards the 
                                                 
107
 The October 2008 up-date of the Union Acquis in Pre-Lisbon JHA is at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/intro/docs/jha_acquis_1008_en.pdf.  See also: V. Mitsilegas, ‘The 
Third Wave of Third Pillar Law: Which Direction for EU Criminal Justice?' (2009) 34 European Law Review, 
pp.  523-560. 
108
 Pre-Lisbon Protocols attached to the EC Treaty and the TEU by the Treaty of Amsterdam established 
specific derogations for Ireland and the United Kingdom from the application of pre-Lisbon Article 14 EC 
Treaty and Title IV EC Treaty (Protocols 3 and 4) and Denmark from the application of pre-Lisbon Title IV EC 
Treaty (Protocol 5). These Protocols, and the Protocol on incorporation of the Schengen acquis, have been 
amended by the TL: see: Peers,  above n. 2; and  M. Fletcher ‘Schengen, the European Court of Justice and 
Flexibility under the Lisbon Treaty: Balancing the United Kingdom’s ‘Ins’ and ‘Outs’’ (2009)  5 European 
Constitutional Law Review,  pp 71-98.   
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jurisdictional powers of the ECJ since the relevant JHA acts do not apply to the opted-out 
Member State.109 
 
2.4. THE ROLE OF THE ECtHR POST-LISBON IN REVIEWING JHA ACTS 
 
As discussed in Section 1.5, the ECtHR adopted a cautious approach in determining the 
scope of its jurisdiction to review the conformity with the ECHR of Union measures adopted 
under pre-Lisbon JHA acts either directly or through implementing national measures. In 
particular, in Segi and Gestoras Pro-Amnistía the ECtHR refused to review the legality of a 
pre-Lisbon Common Position on grounds that are open to criticism. However, developments 
since Segi and Gestoras Pro-Amnistía are likely to reinforce this approach. 
 
Firstly, the Grand Chamber of the ECJ in Kadi asserted the overriding obligation on the 
Union courts to control the legality of Union measures with fundamental rights:  
 
                                                 
109
 The same cannot be said, however, for the TL Protocol on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom. Article (1) of the Protocol provides: ‘The 
Charter does not extend the ability of the Court of Justice of the European Union, or any court or tribunal of 
Poland or of the United Kingdom, to find that the laws, regulations or administrative provisions, practices or 
action of Poland or of the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms and 
principles that it reaffirms.’ See, C. Barnard, ‘The ‘Opt-Out’ for the UK and Poland from the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: Triumph of Rhetoric over Reality?’, in S. Griller and J. Ziller (eds.), The Lisbon Treaty 
(Springer, 2008),  pp. 257-283. 
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‘It follows from the foregoing that the Community judicature must, in 
accordance with the powers conferred on it by the EC Treaty, ensure the 
review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all Community acts 
in light of the fundamental rights forming an integral part of the general 
principles of Community law, including review of Community measures 
which, like the contested regulation, are designed to give effect to the 
resolutions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations.’110  
 
Secondly, the TL has aligned the jurisdiction of the ECJ over the JHA with its general 
jurisdictional powers. As a result, it is unlikely the Bosphorus test for ECtHR review will be 
met post-Lisbon, except arguably in respect of pre-Lisbon JHA acts subject to Article 10(1) 
of the TL Transitional Protocol. Finally, the accession of the Union to the ECHR under 
Article 6(2) TEU will further undermine the case for ECtHR review of JHA acts outside the 
framework of the Union accession to the ECHR. 
 
 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The complexity of the pre-Lisbon TEU provisions on the scope of the ECJ’s jurisdiction over 
JHA measures, combined with the instability created by the delayed ratification process, 
resulted in the pre-Lisbon JHA presenting a confusing and ineffective legal structure for 
                                                 
110
 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and 
Commission, [2008] I-6307, at para. 326.   
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human rights protection. The ECJ sought to alleviate some of the deficiencies of this system, 
in particular in Pupino and Segi v Council. Nevertheless there remain serious concerns as 
regards the availability of access to justice for individuals and effective judicial control over 
pre-Lisbon JHA measures.  The ECtHR in Segi and Gestoras Pro-Amnistía declined the 
opportunity to assert a jurisdictional role in reviewing pre-Lisbon JHA measures outside the 
framework of the Union’s legal order. Although the ECtHR’s judgment in Bosphorus left 
open the possibility of ECtHR jurisdictional review of national JHA implementing measures, 
the strengthening of the ECJ’s jurisdictional powers in the TL over the JHA has reduced the 
likelihood  of such a development. 
 
The reforms in the TL provide a structure for effective judicial control of JHA acts that 
respects the rule of law and provides a coherent framework for the protection of human rights 
in the Union’s legal order. The legal recognition of the Charter and the mandate for the 
Union to accede to the ECHR enhance this protection. The benefits of these reforms have, 
however, been undermined by the transitional provisions applying to the pre-Lisbon JHA 
acquis. As a result the existing case-law on the scope of the ECJ’s jurisdiction to review a 
pre-Lisbon JHA act will continue to be relevant until the expiry of the TL transitional regime.  
